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I. INTRODUCTION
It is 8:00 A.M. on any given week day in a small Missouri town. Adults
are going to work and kids are on their way to school. The train whistle blows
as it has everyday for as long as most can remember. Suddenly there is a
horrible crash. Dust, smoke and debris fill the air. When the dust settles the
train can be seen as a twisted heap of wreckage. When the spectators arrive -
well before the emergency vehicles and crews - they find twenty tank cars
laying at various attitudes of repose. Most seem intact, but two are leaking a
thick, oily substance. Eventually firetrucks, police and paramedics arrive. They
push the crowd back somewhat, but not too far since the engineer has said
that the tank cars didn't contain anything other than waste lubricant from a
factory in Kansas City. Eventually, the wreckage and lubricant are cleaned
up. A little of the stuff did get down into a culvert which carried run-off to a
1
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nearby lake, but no one thought it was enough to do any damage. In the ensu-
ing weeks, however, it is discovered that the lubricant contained TDD, a
highly toxic (and quite hypothetical) byproduct of certain manufacturing
processes. TDD has been linked to cancer in laboratory rats. Fear begins to
spread about the possible results of exposure to the contaminated lubricant.
Soon complaints begin to be heard. Ulcers, rashes, unexplained aches and
pains, headaches, peculiar behavior - even impotence. A lawyer appears in
town saying that she thinks that the citizens have a claim and can sue if they
want. Eventually she does file an action on behalf of 103 of the town's resi-
dents. The suits include the normal damages for injuries sustained, medical
bills, loss of income, loss of consortium and the like. Several of the claims,
however, request damages for the fear of developing and the increased risk of
contracting cancer caused by the exposure. The defendants eventually move
for dismissal of these "cancerphobia" and increased risk claims, asserting that
they fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted.' What should a
judge sitting in Missouri or who must interpret Missouri law decide? Due to
the increased incidence of exposure to toxic substances which has occurred in
Missouri both as a result of accidents2 and intentional acts3 it would not be
surprising to see an increase in the number of such claims being brought in the
Missouri Courts. This Article will explore whether or not a plaintiff will be
able to recover on any of these claims. Initially it should be noted that, as in
the above hypothetical, there are two possible theories to pursue when one is
exposed to a known or suspected carcinogen. The first is to attempt to recover
for the present fear of developing cancer sometime in the future. The second is
to attempt to recover for the additional risk (as opposed to the norm) of devel-
oping cancer which is caused by the exposure to carcinogens.4
1. The events described are hypothetical and are not intended to represent an
actual event or person, living or dead.
2. For example, the train derailment in Sturgeon, Missouri, resulted in alleged
exposure to a toxic level of dioxin.
3. E.g., the spreading of dioxin contaminated oil on the roads of Times Beach,
Missouri or the presence of chlordane in the Missouri River, apparently as a result of
insecticide use. The intent referred to here should not be construed as intentionally
exposing people to toxins. Rather, it refers to the act of spreading the oil or of dumping
the batteries. The author expresses no opinion as to whether anyone knew that the oil
contained dioxin or that the insecticide would contaminate the river.
4. Bennet v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 866-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986); see also Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, _ 507 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1987); Gale & Goyer,
Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CUM. L. REv. 723, 723-
24 (1985). Any given person in the population has a one in four chance of developing a
form of cancer. Any exposure to carcinogens will increase this possibility. A. FRANK,
Cancer, in 13 COURTROOM MEDICINE § 3.20, at 3-14 (1980).
[Vol. 53
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II. FEAR OF CANCER AND Toxwc EXPOSURE
A. Availability of a Parasitic Claim
The fear of contracting a disease sometime in the future has long been
considered to be a type of damage for which a plaintiff may receive compensa-
tion.' Early in their history, these damage claims were considered to be para-
sitic to a claim for bodily injury and akin to more traditional pain and suffer-
ing awards.6 The injury could take a variety of forms. For example, many
early cases allowed plaintiffs to recover for hydrophobia when bitten by a dog.7
Recovery for fear of developing "lockjaw" (tetanus)8 and blood poisoning 9
have also been allowed in dogbite cases. Recovery for blood poisoning and the
like has been allowed when there has been traumatic injury such as the man-
gling of a foot. 10
Two criteria must be met to recover for parasitic fear of future disease
claims have been recognized: first, there must be a pre-existing injury; sec-
ond, the apprehension must be reasonable.1 2 By "reasonable", courts mean
that there must be some medical basis for the fear; for example, being told
about the possibility of the disease by a doctor.' 3 In constrast, if there is a time
limitation inherent in the disease, such as an incubation period, beyond that
period the plaintiff's fears will no longer be deemed reasonable. 14
Legal concerns about fictitious and spurious claims (which are prevalent)
are dispelled by these requirements. Apparently, this is because if a doctor is
concerned about the disease, a patient should not be deemed unreasonable for
5. Dworkin, Fear of Future Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A So-
lution of a Pandora's Box, 53 FORD. L. REV. 527, 542 (1984); Gale & Goyer, supra
note 4, at 529.
6. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 542.
7. See, e.g., Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568, 569, 73 A. 277, 279 (1909); Heintz v.
Caldwell, 16 Ohio C. C. 630, 632, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412, _ (1898); see also Dwor-
kin, supra note 5, at 542.
8. See, e.g., Heintz v. Caldwell, 16 Ohio C.C. 630, 632, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412,
(1898).
9. See, e.g., Camer v. Winchester, 110 S.W.2d 1190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
10. See, e.g., Southern Kansas Ry. v. McSwain, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 317, 118
S.W. 874 (1909).
11. Butts v. National Exch. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168, 173, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084
(1903) (As an element of damages, plaintiff should have been able to show that he was
in reasonable apprehension of blood poisoning due to being struck on the foot with an
iron guard rail. "Mental Suffering... is a proper element of the damage sustained as
the actual physical injury accompanying and causing it.").
12. Id.; see also Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11,
__, 507 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1987) (general policy of Ohio is to allow
recovery for reasonable apprehension caused by present injury); Banter v. Jenson, 121
Wis. 2d 658, -, 360 N.W.2d 529, 533 (1985) (anxiety about a fictitious, imagined,
or highly unlikely consequence is not recoverable).
13. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 545 & n.148.
14. Id. at 542-43 & nn.117-21.
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echoing that concern. The incubation period automatically limits the claims
that can be brought to those for which there is still a chance that the disease
will develop.1 5 It should be noted, however, that although the time limitation
began as a virtual prerequisite to recovery,16 it has been abandoned in subse-
quent cases. 17 This leaves only the reasonable fear and a preexisting injury
requirements for parasitic fear of future disease claims. In addition, due to the
presence of a physical injury, the likelihood of developing the disease need not
be probable (i.e. more likely than not)."8 Thus, it is the existing injury and not
the probability of future disease that is determinative. 19 This is in sharp con-
trast to the claims for increased risk which require a "more probable than
not" showing before recovery is allowed.20
Unfortunately for those who are exposed to toxic substances, the require-
ment of a physical injury bars recovery under this theory. There is no injury
- in the sense of physical injury -as a result of exposure to toxic substances
until some disease2' or other physical damage manifests itself.2 2 This is due to
the fact that, because toxic intrusion into the body occurs at the molecular
level, no one can examine the plaintiff and see evidence of the intrusion. Un-
less injury is redefined to include intrusion at the cellular or molecular level,23
a parasitic claim for fear of cancer cannot be pursued. As a result, those
courts which have allowed claims for cancerphobia and related fears have re-
lied on the independent tort of infliction of emotional distress.2 4 Of course, if
the fear of developing cancer does spring from an existing injury the parasitic
claim will be allowed.25
15. Id. at 543.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885
(1912); see also Dworkin, supra note 5, at 543 & n.124.
18. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 544-45 & nn.142-45.
19. Id. at 544.
20. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
21. E.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(plaintiff had developed asbestosis at the time his cancerphobia claim was brought).
22. E.g., Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996
(1958) (burns resulting from exposure to radiation).
23. This has been done by some courts. See, e.g, Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982). That case held that ingestion of water contami-
nated with chlordane was sufficient to satisfy the physical consequences requirement
under a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. If, however, mere ingestion
satisfies that requirement, it should satisfy the physical injury requirement for a para-
sitic claim. The key to both is that there has been an injury to the plaintiff's person.
Furthermore, they function in the same way, namely, as an external limit on causes of
action to insure that plaintiffs bring legitimate claims.
24. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 545.
25. See, e.g., Cover v. Painless Parker Dentist, 105 Cal. App. 110, 286 P. 1048
(1930); Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 64, 12 A.2d 677 (1940); Anderson v. Welding Test-
ing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974); Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J.
56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176
N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E.
[Vol. 53
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B. History and Availability of Intentional and Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress
The emotional distress tort comes in two varieties: intentional and negli-
gent.26 The traditional requirements, as set out in the RESTATEMENT, for re-
covery under intentional infliction of emotional distress are:
1) Defendant must act in an extreme and outrageous way; and
2) Such acts result in emotional upset which must itself produce physical
consequences such as illness unless defendant's conduct is so outrageous
as to be evidence of the distress in and of itself
27
A defendant's action will be deemed outrageous if it either offends the sensi-
bilities of a reasonable person28 or if it abuses a special position2" or knowl-
edge". Mere insults or annoying behavior are not sufficient for recovery.3 1
To recover under the traditional rules for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff not only had to show physical manifestations resulting from
the alleged distress,32 but also had to allege and prove a physical impact with
his or her body which was proximately caused by defendant's negligent con-
duct.33 If either of these was missing a plaintiff could not recover.3 4 These
were required because of the continuing concern with fraudulent claims.3 5
These strict requirements, however, have been significantly relaxed in re-
cent years. The impact rule has been abandoned in favor of other limitations
which maintain control over potentially frivolous claims while expanding the
availability of recovery. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts advo-
cates the adoption of a "zone of danger" rule which would impose liability on
a defendant if he should have foreseen that his conduct might cause distress,
that the distress might result in illness or other bodily harm, and the distress
causes such illness or injury without regard to whether defendant's conduct
directly resulted in other independent physical injuries.3 6 A majority of juris-
dictions have adopted this rule or a variation of it.3 7
885 (1912); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980);
Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974) (claims al-
lowed, but recovery denied in this case due to likelihood of developing cancer out-
weighed by defendant's innocence).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46, 312, 313, 436, 436A (1965).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46(1) & comment k (1965).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment f (1965).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comments d, e (1965).
32. For example, an illness of some sort.
33. See, e.g., Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 90, 267 S.W. 400, 406 (1924).
34. Id. (by implication); see also Dworkin, supra note 5, at 531.
35. E.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971); see also Dworkin,
supra note 5, at 531 & n.28-29.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436, 436A (1965).
37. Gale & Goyer, supra note 4, at 728.
1988]
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A few courts have gone even further by removing the physical injury re-
quirement of the Restatement and replacing it with a "seriousness" test.3"
Under this test the severity of the emotional injury is tested rather than the
physical consequences thereof. If the distress can be categorized as "serious"
and proximately caused by defendant's negligence, a plaintiff can recover
without ever developing physical consequences."9
The largest expansion of liability for negligent infliction is in the area of
third party recovery. With the case of Dillon v. Legg,40 California again led
the way to recovery for emotional distress suffered by a bystander who wit-
nesses defendant's negligent act. As long as the bystander is in close proximity
to the accident, contemporaneously observes a negligent act which results in
bodily injury to another, and has a sufficiently close relationship to the injured
person, recovery will be allowed. 41 This theory will probably be of little or no
use in the toxic exposure area. The "contemporaneously sensing" requirement
is impossible to fulfill in the toxic exposure context, since the exposure - in
the sense of impact with a third persons body - occurs on a molecular level.
In addition, it is at least arguable that no bodily injury (as the California
court seems to define the term) has occurred. In other words, there is no trau-
matic injury as was present in Dillon.41
The other theories of negligent infliction have been and will continue to
be used in toxic exposure cases due to the difficulty of proving a pre-existing
injury and the arguable obsolescence of the parasitic claim. 43 In addition, the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be available since it is
possible that defendants know about the toxic nature of the substances they
produce, transport and/or dispose, but have failed to act to protect people
from exposure or have concealed the toxicity.44 Intentional or reckless endan-
gering of public health and safety seems to fall within the ambit of outrageous
conduct.45
38. E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P. 2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
39. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
40. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
41. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. In Dillon, the plaintiff
claiming emotional distress was the mother of an injured child. Id. at 742, 441 P.2d at
921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
42. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 533-34 & nn.47-54.
43. As stated earlier, there is no pre-existing physical injury claim to which the
claim for fear of cancer can be parasitic. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying
text. In addition, the parasitic damages are arguably obsolete since pre-existing injury
is no longer needed to recover by virtue of infliction of emotional distress being an
independent tort. This is especially true in light of the abrogation of the impact rule.
44. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924,
925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
45. See generally Dworkin, supra note 5, at 556-58.
[Vol. 53
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C. Recovery for Fear of Cancer
1. Generally
There seems to be a consensus among the courts that a claim for present
fear of developing cancer is available so long as the elements of the tort of
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress are met." If impact is
required it must be plead and proved. But this is not difficult to do. For exam-
ple, there are several cases which hold that any contact of toxic substances
with the body is sufficient to satisfy the impact requirement 7 even if this con-
tact is at the cellular level."8
The essence of impact, then, is that the outside force or substance, no matter
how large or small, visible or invisible, and no matter that the effects are not
immediately deleterious, touch or enter the plaintiff's body."
Likewise, if physical consequences are required before recovery is al-
lowed, failure to provide evidence thereof will subject plaintiff's claim to a
motion for dismissal. This requirement has, however, been relaxed to the point
of non-existence in some jurisdictions.50 Recovery is allowed under this view
even where no illness or injury resulted from the exposure, where the distress
produced no symptoms and where it was not severe enough to require medical
attention. 1 Clearly, if any illness or other physical injury is produced either by
the exposure itself or by the resulting emotional distress, recovery will be al-
lowed under the physical consequences rule just as in other emotional distress
claims.
In addition to those in impact and/or physical manifestations, many
courts base a claim for fear of developing cancer on a reasonableness standard
derived from the earlier parasitic fear of disease cases, reasoning that the im-
pact and/or physical consequences justify the fear.52 This requirement of rea-
sonable fear has led some courts to distinguish between the simple "fear of
cancer" claim and actions seeking recovery for "cancerphobia". 53 According to
46. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1985); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d Il1 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Eagle-
Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Devlin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985); Laxton v. Orkin Extermi-
nating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
47. See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 564-65, 461
A.2d 184, 186 (Law Div. 1983); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431,
434 (Tenn. 1982).
48. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
49. Id. at 527.
50. See, e.g., Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982)
(ingestion of water adulterated with chlordane is sufficient manifestation to meet rule).
51. Id. at 433, 435.
52. See, e.g., Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 434; Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at
527; Devlin, 202 N.J. Super at 561, 495 A.2d at 498.
53. Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 527 n.13; Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at 562,
495 A.2d at 499.
1988]
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these courts, "fear of cancer" is a non-idiosyncratic response to the exposure.
"Cancerphobia", on the other hand, is an exaggerated, persistent, often irra-
tional fear recognized as a psychiatric illness." The distinction, therefore, is
between a simple fear which any person might develop and a "phobia" which
is considered a mental illness.55 This gives a court which is especially hostile to
such claims a means to deny recovery if their jurisdiction imposes no duty to
foresee idiosyncratic emotional responses to a defendant's allegedly negligent
conduct.5 6
A more probable use of the distinction, however, will be determining how
plaintiff must prove that his or her fears have a reasonable basis. If it is simply
a "fear of" claim, a lay person (i.e. the plaintiff) can testify as to the fear and
its basis. If the claim is one for "cancerphobia", an expert is needed for this
purpose.57 The latter view is bolstered by the factors required to prove the
claim. In Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation58 for example, the
courts required a plaintiff to prove:
1) Plaintiff currently suffers from serious fear, emotional distress, or di-
agnosed phobia;
2) Such condition was caused by the exposure;
3) Fear due to the exposure is reasonable;
4) Defendant(s) are legally responsible for the exposure. 9
The inclusion of "diagnosed phobias" in the elements necessary for recov-
ery suggests that even idiosyncratic responses by individual plaintiffs will be
compensable as long as a breach of duty and proximate cause are established.
If an expert testifies that a normally constituted person might develop such
fears, compensation will follow more easily. This lends further support to the
notion that the resolution of the apparent contraction (between idiosyncratic
responses and reasonable fears) is found in that "reasonable" applies to a
medical basis for the fear rather than to the character of the fear itself.
In jurisdictions which only require the defendant to foresee that distress
would result from his conduct and that such distress is "serious''0 a whole
different range of problems arise." This test is analogous to Missouri's posi-
54. Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 526 n.13; Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at 562,
495 A.2d at 499.
55. Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at 562, 495 A.2d at 499.
56. See, e.g., Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at 562, 495 A.2d at 500.
57. Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 526 n.13; Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at 562,
495 A.2d at 499.
58. 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985).
59. Id. - , 495 A.2d at 499 (emphasis added).
60. E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
61. Namely questions relating to duty, foreseeability of the distress and the grav-
ity of the harm. It should be noted that these problems do not arise in cases where
impact and physical consequences arise since these admittedly arbitrary parameters
establish the fact that the fears are genuine. Thus, the foreseeability issue shifts from
the fear itself to whether the defendant had a duty to foresee a possibility of physical
[Vol. 53
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For many years Missouri followed the mainstream with regard to both
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. For intentional inflic-
tion, both the requisite conduct (i.e. outrageous or intentional) and physical
manifestations were required. 63 In negligent infliction cases, both impact and
physical manifestations were required." But the case of Bass v. Nooney6"
changed this position with respect to negligent infliction. Bass involved a plain-
tiff who sued two defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ms.
Bass claimed to have suffered a variety of psychiatric symptoms as a result of
being trapped in an elevator for approximately one half hour. She relied on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and alleged no impact.6 6 Because plaintiff suf-
fered no "contemporaneous traumatic physical injury"6 7 the trial court entered
a directed verdict for the defendants.68 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed
and, in so doing, changed over one hundred years of Missouri law. 69 Citing
numerous cases, commentaries and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§436A the court elected to abolish the impact rule.70 Further, pointing to the
difficulty in distinguishing between physical injury and emotional injury, the
court abandoned the "physical consequence rule" of prior case law and the
RESTATEMENT. 7 1 Instead, the Court in Bass held that to recover for negligent
injury. The difficulty in proving the foreseeability of the distress has led one commenta-
tor to suggest that many plaintiffs who can satisfy the liberalized impact and physical
consequence rules would not be able to satisfy the even more "liberal" tests. Dworkin,
supra note 5, at 546.
62. See infra notes 76-77, 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
potential problems faced. A comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment due to the complexity of the issue noted by the court in Bennett v. Mallinckrodt,
698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986). For a more
comprehensive analysis, see G. NOTHSTEIN, Toxic TORTS §§ 16.05 -. 11 (1984).
63. Warren v. Parish, 436 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1969); Young v. Stensrude, 664
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); La Brier v. Anheuser Food, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790,
793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
64. Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (abolishing the im-
pact and physical consequences rules); Williams v. School Dist. of Springfield, 447
S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969); Gambill v. White, 303 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1957); Weisman v.
Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 267 S.W. 400 (1924); Trigg v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 74 Mo.
147 (1881).
65. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
66. Id. at 766.
67. Id. at 768.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 772 (abolishing the impact rule and overruling e.g., Williams v. School
Dist. of Springfield, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969); Trigg v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry.,
74 Mo. 174 (1881)).
70. Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 769-72 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
71. Id. at 772.
1988]
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infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must prove that:
1) The defendant should have realized that his conduct involve and un-
reasonable risk of causing the distress; and
2) The emotional distress or mental injury is medically diagnosable and
of sufficient severity as to be medically significant.2
Since the physical consequences rule applied to both negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress under pre-Bass law, the second facet of the
Bass holding should be applied to intentional infliction cases as well. 3
As stated earlier, it is clear that a cause of action exists for present fear
of developing cancer as long as the individual jurisdiction's requirements for
the tort of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress are met. 1
This is apparently the case in Missouri as well.71 In applying Bass to fear of
developing cancer two things become evident. The first is the difficultly in
proving foreseeability of causing distress. 8 The second is how are
"diagnosable" and "medically significant" to be defined.
Apart from the difficulty in pleading sufficient facts to support foresee-
ability, proof at trial could pose some interesting problems. At the outset it
should be noted that foreseeability goes to the existence of a duty and to the
issue of proximate cause. Thus, if plaintiff's fears were not foreseeable then
the defendant can be exonerated either because he or she had no duty or that
plaintiff's injuries were not proximately caused by defendant's actions. It is
unlikely, however, that these cases would be decided on a duty analysis. Duty
has to do with whether or not the subject matter involved creates a substantial
enough relationship between plaintiff and defendant to give rise to an obliga-
tion on the part of defendant to protect plaintiff from any adverse conse-
quences of defendant's actions.7 8 The very nature of the substances involved
gives rise to the fact that not only is there a possibility of distress but also of
physical damage (both in injury resulting from the accident and the potential
development of disease). This creates a situation in which a duty arises. 9 In-
deed, it seems tautological that a defendant involved in the production, trans-
portation and disposal of toxic materials owes a duty to conduct his affairs in a
72. Id. at 772-73; see also Young v. Stensrude, 664 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
73. Young v. Stensrude, 664 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
74. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
75. Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, 698 S.W.2d 854, 866-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986) (holding that plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed
due to failure to plead foreseeability of distress as required by Bass v. Nooney, 646
S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
76. Id.
77. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 297-98 (5th ed.
1984).
78. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1953).
79. Note, Young v. Stensrude: Fishing Through Bass for the Boundaries of
Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 51 Mo. L. REv. 579, 593 (1986); see also Bass
v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 774 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
[Vol. 53
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way which limits or prevents exposure to such materials."0 In addition, there is
the practical observation that in the overwhelming number of tort cases a duty
is assumed without comment."1
At first glance, the analysis of duty in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases which require a physical injury establish a standard as arbitrary
as the impact rule. This approach, however, seems to be supported by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court's decision in Bass. 2 It must be noted, however, that the
vague language 8 of the Bass holding allows for other methods of establishing
duty. For example, the social utility of defendant's conduct could be vastly
outweighed by a foreseeable risk of mental distress." In the area of toxic ex-
posure duty could be imposed in this way if, for example, the defendant was
guilty of illegal dumping or had not followed proper procedures for disposing
of the substances. One author commenting on the Bass holding seemed to
think that inclusion of physical factors was somehow inappropriate.8 5 One
must remember, however, that the movement toward an independent tort for
emotional distress has been an expansion of the law. It cannot be doubted that
the more novel elements of the emotional distress tort include cases which
involve facts fitting the elements of previous law. For example, allowing a
claim based on purely emotional harm will not preclude claims which involve
an impact or physical consequences. Likewise, the inclusion of physical injury
as a criteria for finding duty does not preclude protection based on purely
emotional harms. Rather, it allows a judge to escape the vagaries involved in
the peripheral, purely emotional claims in that it allows reference to a more
concrete source of duty. In other words, if physical damage is threatened, any
distress resulting from that danger clearly would fall within the protection af-
forded by the independent tort, since the tort protects emotional tranquility by
itself. If the law can establish a duty based on purely emotional consequences
then surely a duty exists if one's physical integrity is threatened.88 Because
duty usually exists, the main foreseeability issue involved in fear of developing
cancer cases will be aimed at proximate cause - a jury issue which presents
several proof problems.
There are at least three factual questions which are potential problems
with regard to exposure to toxic substances and the subsequent fear of can-
80. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
81. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Al-
location of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 13.
82. Note, supra note 79, at 593 & n.115.
83. The language in question says that a plaintiff can recover if defendant should
have realized that his conduct involved any risk of causing the distress. Bass v. Nooney,
646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
84. Note, supra note 79, at 594.
85. Id. at 593 (stating that referring to physical risk was arbitrary and primarily
protected plaintiff from physical harm).
86. The sphere of claims for emotional injury alone is obviously larger than (and




Kidwell: Kidwell: Cancerphobia and Increased Risk
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
336 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
cer.8 7 All three are the proper subject of expert testimony.8 8 To begin with, the
very nature of connecting certain chemicals with cancer is speculative. Even
though there are "known" carcinogens, 89 exposure to these does not defini-
tively establish that one will develop cancer. At best, exposure increases the
risk and such an increase seem to suggest a causal connection.
For example, exposure to tobacco smoke and asbestos increases one's
chances of getting cancer by a factor of ninety,90 but exposure does not guar-
antee that a person who smokes and has breathed asbestos will develop lung
cancer. Lung cancer occurs approximately 4 in 100,000 people - or approxi-
mately .0004 percent of the population. A person exposed to asbestos and to-
bacco smoke combined is ninety times more likely to develop cancer.9 1 Thus,
their risk has been increased to a .0036 percent chance when compared to the
normal population. Even taken as a distinct group, those who are exposed to
asbestos fibers still have a significant chance of not contracting cancer. One
study cited in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp92 found that even after
development of asbestosis there is only a 12% chance of (or an 88 % chance of
not) developing peritoneal mesothelioma and a 15% chance of (or an 85%
chance of not) developing pleural mesothelioma.93 In any event, the issue here
is not whether or not certain chemicals cause or do not cause cancer. The
likelihood of developing cancer does, however, impinge on the issue of foresee-
ability. If the likelihood is sufficiently small the plaintiff's fear would become
87. This should by no means be considered an exhaustive list. It simply presents
a few potential problems recognized by the author.
88. When jurors are incapable of reaching intelligent opinions due to a lack of
knowledge or experience about the subject under inquiry without outside assistance,
expert testimony is appropriate. Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.
1978). Due to the complex knowledge of chemistry and its effects on the human body
needed to evaluate the toxicity and cancer causing potential of substances, these are
proper subjects of expert testimony.
89. Some known carcinogens and some cancers they cause are:
Asbestos - Lung, mesothelioma Contraceptives - Liver
Arsenic - Skin, Lung Coal Tar - Skin
Androgens - Liver DES - Vagina
Aflotoxin - Liver Estrogen - Uterus
4-Alminobiphenal - Bladder Mustard Gas - Lung
Alkylating Agents - Leukemia Nickel - Lung Larynx
Benzidine - Leukemia Beta-Naphthylamine - Bladder
Benzene - Leukemia Schistosomiasis - Bladder
Betel Nut - Mouth Tobacco Smoking - Lung/Mouth
Bis-chloromethyl Ether - Lung Thorotrast - Hemangiosarcoma
Chromates - Lung Vinyl Chloride - Hemangiosarcoma
Chlornapheine - Bladder Wood Smoke - Nasal sinus
Cadmium - Prostate
A. FRANK, Cancer, in 13 COURTROOM MEDICINE § 3.02, at 3-3, table 1 (1980).
90. Id. § 3.11.
91. Id.
92. 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
93. Id. at 111, 120 n.45.
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unreasonable. If that is the case then it follows that a reasonable defendant
would not foresee causing the distress.94 Thus, a plaintiff must at least provide
evidence 5 indicating that the increased risk provides a reasonable basis for his
or her fear. 6 The speculative nature of the risk (i.e. that there is no guarantee
that plaintiff will ever develop cancer) leaves an opening for defense counsel
which plaintiff's attorneys cannot close.
Additionally, one must consider the quantity of the alleged carcinogen to
which the plaintiff was allegedly exposed. There is the potential issue of
whether or not the chemical in question is toxic in the concentrations at which
plaintiff was exposed. If such an issue is presented there obviously must be
evidence in the record to the effect that the chemical is toxic in that concen-
tration. For example, in the hypothetical set out in the INTRODUCTION above,
there was sufficient TDD in the tank car to make a concentration of one part
per trillion. Suppose also that there are no studies which show that TDD expo-
sure increases the risk of developing cancer when the concentration is less than
one part per billion. However, certain experts suspect it to be toxic in concen-
trations as minute as one in ten trillion. The basic question becomes whether a
reasonable defendant would transport such quantities of TDD by tank car de-
spite the possibility of derailment and leakage given that the extent of scien-
tific knowledge shows that the chemical is safe in the concentrations in which
it is transported.97 If such a defendant would, then a reasonable plaintiff would
94. Missouri law does require that the anxiety be reasonable. Pandjiris v. Oliver
Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 771, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936) (apparently adopting rule); Butts v.
National Exch. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168, 72 S.W. 1083 (1903). These cases are of the
parasitic variety. However, the expansion from only parasitic recovery for emotional
distress to an independent tort should not be read as to eliminating this rule.
95. This will most likely have to take the form of expert testimony. To establish
medical causation scientific or medical evidence establishing the cause/effect relation-
ship between the complained of condition (i.e., cancer and/or fear of cancer) and the
alleged cause (i.e., the substance the plaintiff was exposed to) is required. Reed v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 664 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Clev-
enger v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980));
see also Harrison v. Weller, 423 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Northern Kansas
City Memorial Hosp. v. Wiley, 385 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
96. It should be noted that the reasonable basis test does go to the foreseeability
of the distress and not the medically diagnosable/significant prong of the Bass test.
The last prong deals with the severity of the distress and not the source of those fears.
Thus, it appears possible that even though a plaintiff has a reasonable basis for his
fears (i.e., there is a body of evidence regarding the substance's toxicity and linkage to
cancer sufficient enough to find that an ordinary person would suffer from fear) if those
fears are not diagnosable and significant, plaintiff cannot recover. Likewise, even if
plaintiff's fears do result in a diagnosable illness, if an ordinary person would have been
able to emotionally handle the exposure the plaintiff should not recover since the de-
fendant could not foresee the distress.
97. It should be noted that this does seem to implicate what has been called the
"state of the art" defense, i.e., that the defendant could not foresee a risk unknown
under present technology and knowledge. What the precise interrelation is between
toxic torts and the state of the art will not be discussed.
19881
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not develop reasonable fears as a result of such exposure. Since the lay person
generally could not be deemed to have adequate knowledge with regard to
toxic chemicals to decide this question, it is almost certain that experts must
be employed to prove whether or not the defendant should foresee the distress
after considering the evidence available. In the hypothetical stated above, the
plaintiff will attempt to produce experts who would emphasize the suspicions
about TDD and, as a consequence of those suspicions, testify that the defend-
ant should have anticipated the plaintiff's fears. The defendant, on the other
hand, will produce experts saying that TDD is not toxic in the levels at which
plaintiff was exposed, and thus plaintiff has no reasonable basis for his fears.
As a result, the defendant could not foresee the emotional distress.
Third, there could be an issue over whether the chemical is toxic at all.
For example, in the hypothetical, suppose that there is a study or two linking
TDD to cancer, but that for some reason there is a substantial debate over the
studies' conclusiveness. The plaintiff will again have to try to introduce evi-
dence that the chemical is toxic and that evidence is sufficient to make his
fears reasonable. The defendant will also produce experts who insist that the
chemical is not toxic.
This potential swearing match between experts as to the reasonable basis
issue, the issue of trying to discover safe levels of exposure, and the third issue
regarding the preliminary matter of whether a chemical is toxic at all, all have
a horrendous potential for long, expensive trials which may not even result in a
favorable verdict for the plaintiff.98 The opinions of the experts will be based
on complex studies and statistics whose methodology and results must be ex-
plained. Thus the jury will be left with volumes of complex statistical data
which can be both conflicting and beyond their understanding. Even if we as-
sume that most juries will understand the data, they are nonetheless left with
no real guidance as to the determinative question: which group of experts is
correct? 99
The need for expert testimony is further exacerbated by the Bass Court's
insistence that a plaintiff's fears be medically diagnosable and medically sig-
nificant. Testimony as to medical issues requires an expert witness, especially
where mental disturbance is at issue.100 Thus, the "fear of"/"Cancerphobia"
98. E.g., Kemner v. Monsanto, Inc., involved claims for damages by several resi-
dents of Sturgeon, Missouri resulting from exposure to dioxin and soon became the
longest jury trial in U.S. history. Although a sum in the area of $100,000 was awarded
to certain landowners for damages resulting froin the spill and subsequent clean up, the
damages for exposure to the dioxin was only $62 - one dollar for every plaintiff.
Sixteen million was awarded in punitive damages, but there is a serious question as to
whether this is appropriate since punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to
actual damages. As a result, the case is currently on appeal.
99. See Robin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinter-
pretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981).
100. When mental condition is at issue expert testimony is permissable. Bedenk
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1955). Questions involving emotional
disturbance are complex, particularly appropriate for science and one which no jury
[Vol. 53
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distinction of cases such as Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.'0x is unavail-
able in Missouri as far as the rule's substance is concerned. Missouri requires
expert medical testimony for recovery under Bass and thus a lay witness can-
not testify as to simple "fear of" claims.
Another issue raised by the second prong of the Bass test is the standard
by which "diagnosable" and "significant" distress is to be decided. 102 Both
have yet to be defined.10 3 Although it has been suggested that the judge will
decide the "medically diagnosable" portion of the severity test, 04 it is equally
arguable, in light of the need for expert testimony, that both "medically signif-
icant" and "medically diagnosable" can be determined by the jury after com-
petent witnesses present evidence that plaintiff's fears meet (or don't meet) the
requirements of the Bass test. 0 5 Since this test is arguably within the jury's
provence, perhaps it is better that the terms remain undefined yet subject to
the same standards as other medical testimony. It has been noted, however,
that when there is competing expert testimony the jury is left with no real
guidance to help it decide between the experts. Thus, the cost of expert testi-
mony when combined with the uncertainty surrounding the jury decisions
gives trivial claims a potentially high settlement value. Whether or not this
result is prudent in light of the court's traditional concern with frivolous suits
in the area is a question which remains to be answered. 1 6
Despite the complexity and somewhat speculative nature of the proof, the
cost of the expert testimony, and the vague standards applied to defining the
terms, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional destress should not be fore-
closed.107 As a result, it would be a safe conclusion that claims for fear of
cancer and cancerphobia are available under Missouri law.
III. STRICT LIABILITY
One author has noted the possibility of pursuing a strict liability theory to
recover in toxic exposure cases. But he notes that no courts have allowed such
should be permitted to resolve without expert testimony. Harrison v. Weller, 423
S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
101. 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. 1985).
102. A plaintiff must apparently satisfy both due to the Bass court's use of the
conjunctive. See Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73; see also Note, supra note 79, at 597.
Interestingly, while a plaintiff must plead that his distress is both medically
diagnosable and medically significant he or she is not required to seek medical atten-
tion. Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Prod., 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
103. Note, supra note 79, at 597.
104. Id. at 597 n.153.
105. For example, the plaintiff's medical expert can give his or her opinion that
the plaintiff's emotional distress is medically diagnosable and medically significant. De-
fense counsel can also present evidence rebutting that testimony. This would give the
jury ample evidence on both issues to properly decide the question.
106. See Robin, supra note 99; Note, supra note 79, at 598 n.160.
107. Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, 698 S.W.2d 854, 866-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986).
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claims.108 This may no longer be the case. Bennett v. Mallincktdodt'0 9 has
opened up the possibility that such a theory can be used, at least in cases of
radiation exposure." 0 The avenue followed is strict liability for "ul-
trahazardous"'l or "abnormally dangerous""' 2 activities.,1 3 Missouri adheres
to the "true rule" of strict liability as set down in the landmark case of Ry-
lands v. Fletcher."14 That rule states that a person is strictly liable for dam-
ages created by non-natural uses of land."56 Before Bennett, the rule had lim-
ited application in Missouri. In fact, it was restricted to blasting cases." 0
Noting that the dangers inherent in the nuclear industry were as great as
those involved in blasting, the Eastern District Court of Appeals in Bennett
held that the plaintiff could attempt to prove a strict liability claim. 117 Observ-
ing that no Missouri cases had specifically adopted either version of the Amer-
ican Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 and that there
was no prohibition against doing so," 8 the Bennett court decided to adopt §§
519-520 regarding this facet of strict liability.119 The court then instructed the
trial court to develop a record on remand which would enable it to evaluate
the plaintiff's claim in light of the factors set out in §520.120 The factors are as
follows:
1) existence of a high degree of risk to the person, land or chattels of
others;
2) the likelihood that harm would be great;
3) inability to eliminate risk by exercise of reasonable care;
4) extent that the activity is not a matter of common usage;
5) the inappropriateness of the activity in the place where it is carried
on;
6) the extent that the activity's value is outweighed by its
108. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 560-61.
109. Bennett, 698 S.W.2d at 866-67.
110. Id. at 867, 869.
111. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
113. Id.
114. 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), affid as modified, 3 L.R.-Ex. 330 (1868).
115. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-Ex. 330, 338 (1868). There has been some con-
fusion concerning the rule. The Exchequer Chamber said that if a defendant brought
anything onto his land that is likely to "do mischief if it escapes", and it does escape,
the landowner is strictly liable. On appeal, the House of Lords narrowed that holding
to non-natural land use. In the United States, however, it has wrongly been held that
the "true rule" was that developed by the Exchequer Chamber and, as such, has been
soundly rejected. In fact the "true rule" is the modified version of the House of Lords.
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, 698 S.W.2d 854, 867-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1176 (1986); see also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 505-06 (4th ed.
1971).
116. Bennett, 698 S.W.2d at 868 and cases cited therein.
117. Bennett, 698 S.W.2d at 867-69.
118. Id. at 867.








Evaluating a claim under the "abnormally dangerous" theory of strict lia-
bility involves a balancing of risks and benefits similar to that involved in nui-
sance actions.122 When applied to toxic exposure, it is clear that some cases
can be brought under the "abnormally dangerous" doctrine. First, exposure to
toxic substances often results in the same harm created by radiation; cancer.
Since this result was sufficiently analogous to the danger of blasting in Bennett
to allow a claim in strict liability for radiation exposure, it should also be
sufficient to allow a court to say that the dangers inherent in toxic substances
are as great as those involved in blasting. This similarity alone might be
enough to prompt a court to allow a strict liability claim. Even if it is not,
however, one can certainly imagine cases where the risks of the defendant's
activities outweigh the benefits. For example, illegal dumping serves no bene-
fits at all and creates a very substantial risk. Even when defendant's conduct is
non-culpable or non-negligent, the factors of § 520 may weigh in favor of
strict liability. In toxic exposure there is clearly a threat of harm to persons in
both their physical conditions and emotional well being. Further, that the
harm is potentially great is also clear in that the potential physical injury is a
life threatening disease"' and the emotional damage can reach the extent of a
phobia. Even using reasonable care will not avoid the risk. A potential defend-
ant cannot remove the toxic nature of some chemicals and there is always
some risk of exposure resulting from even non-negligent occurrences. In addi-
tion, the production and/or disposal of toxic substances is hardly a common
activity. With four of § 520's six factors apparently satisfied, the only hope for
those involved in the production, transportation and disposal of toxic sub-
stances is that the benefit to society of their activity outweighs the risks in-
volved or that the activity occurs in an appropriate area. These factors, how-
ever, must be considered on an ad hoc basis. It is likely that certain activities
will fail these factors as well. Since a defendant is liable for all damages re-
sulting from his "abnormally dangerous" activity, there appears to be no bar
to recovering for emotional distress or latent diseases under strict liability so
long as proximate cause is shown. If strict liability is applicable in toxic expo-
sure cases, the boundaries of liability will be expanded greatly. Those plaintiffs
unable to prove negligence will still be able to recover under Restatement §
519 and § 520.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
122. Bennett, 698 S.W.2d at 869.
123. Cancer, like other exposure related diseases, does have a long latency pe-
riod. This could prove problematic in those jurisdictions which have a statute of limita-
tions running from the date of negligence. Thus, even a strict liability theory would be
barred in such jurisdictions since the disease manifests itself long after the statute has
run. As will be seen, however, Missouri's statute of limitations runs from when the
damage is ascertainable (i.e., discovered). As a result, a strict liability theory will be
available to a plaintiff many years after the exposure occurs, provided that he had not
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IV. RECOVERY FOR INCREASED RISK
A. Availability in General
Most courts that have held that a plaintiff may not recover for increased
risk of developing cancer unless he or she can prove that it is more probable
than not that he or she will develop cancer in the future. 124 This is based on
the long held notion that damages which are contingent, speculative, or merely
possible are not recoverable. In other words, a threat of future harm which has
not yet materialized is insufficient to produce a damage award.'2" "More prob-
able than not" has been interpreted to mean that if there is a "reasonable
certainty" or "reasonable probability," a plaintiff could recover." 8 Usually
this requires a likelihood of greater than fifty percent.217 A standard this rigor-
ous is unlikely to be met in that the likelihood of developing cancer often re-
mains below fifty percent." 8 Thus, unlike the cases of parasitic increased risk
of developing diseases (i.e. increased risk coupled with pre-existing injury),
where a simple possibility is included in damages, 29 a plaintiff in a toxic expo-
sure case will not be allowed to recover for increased risk under present law or
unless other theories are developed to allow a different method of recovery.' 30
B. Missouri Law
Missouri follows the majority view with regard to increased risk as a fu-
124. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.
1986) (applying Mississippi law after Mississippi Supreme Court refused to certify cer-
tain questions); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Texas law); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 520
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495
A.2d 485 (1985); Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507
N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1987). See generally Note, Damages for an Increased Risk
of Developing Cancer Caused by Asbestos Exposure Are Only Recoverable if it is
More Likely Than Not that Cancer Will Develop, 51 Mo. L. REv. 847 (1986)
125. See, e.g., Stuart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 450 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed.
1984).
126. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138; Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d
111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Morissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d
1369 (1979); Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at -, 495 A.2d at 500 (citing Coll v. Sherry,
29 N.J. 166, 148 A.2d 481 (1959)). A majority of jurisdictions take this approach.
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony as to Future Consequences of
Injury as Affected by Expression in Terms of Probability or Possibility, 75 A.L.R.3D
9, 17-18 (1977).
127. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1129; Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md.
656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983); Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at 556, 495 A.2d at 495; see Note,
supra note 124, at 848 n.9.
128. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Gale & Goyer, supra
note 4, at 737.
130. Four of these theories will be discussed infra at 142-97.
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ture damage traceable to exposure. With little discussion, the Eastern District
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal as too speculative of an increased risk
claim arising out of alleged exposure to radiation.' 31 This result seems to be
dictated by Missouri law. In Missouri, damages that are contingent and
merely possible are not recoverable. 132 Thus, only those damages which are
probable are recoverable."'3 Despite that the standard for the question of fu-
ture consequences is dubious in Missouri,"' it is evident from case law that a
plaintiff must establish that future consequences are more likely than not
before he or she can recover for those consequences."35 The source of this con-
fusion is that an expert's opinion as to the possibility of future consequences is
admissable to aid the jury in evaluating other evidence regarding those conse-
quences but does not constitute a submissable case on those consequences
standing on its own." 6 Thus, as the holding in Bennett v. Mallinckrodt'37 indi-
cates, if all a plaintiff can do is produce an expert who testifies that it is only
possible that cancer will develop, his or her case will be dismissed. This will be
the only result possible in increased risk of cancer cases. The evidence of possi-
bility of getting cancer cannot be used to evaluate other evidence since only
expert testimony is available with regard to the increased risk. This is because
the scientific and medical knowledge needed to evaluate and quantify that in-
creased risk is beyond the jury's knowledge. In addition, most experts will not
131. Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986) (citing Morissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d
753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979)); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561,
461 A.2d 184 (Law Div. 1983); and Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d
130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1984).
132. Hoffman v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 255 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1953); Pandjiris
v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936); Harrison v. Weller, 423
S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct. App.
1961).
133. Turner v. Yellow Cab Co., 361 S.W.2d 149, 154-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
134. Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony as to Future Con-
sequences of Injury as Affected by Expression in Terms of Probability, 75 A.L.R.3D 9,
33-35 (1977).
135. The following cases required a reasonable probability: Hill v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 359 Mo. 220, 221 S.W.2d 130 (1949); Meily v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R.,
215 Mo. 567, 114 S.W. 1013 (1908) (by implication); Barr v. City of Kansas, 121 Mo.
22, 25 S.W. 562 (1894); Oliver v. City of Vandalia, 28 S.W.2d 1044 (Mo. Ct. App.
1930); Gorman v. A.R. Jackson Kansas City Showcase Works Co., 19 S.W.2d 559
(Mo. Ct. App. 1929).
The following cases required a reasonable certainty: Mahany v. Kansas City R.R.,
286 Mo. 601, 228 S.W. 821 (1921); Garard v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 207
Mo. 242, 105 S.W. 767 (1907); Stuart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d
450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct. App 1961).
But see Stephens v. Guffey, 409 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1966) (stating that a question
asking whether or not "something might, could or would produce a certain result" held
not improper because experts opinion regarding possibility and probability is often of
aid to the jury); McPherson v. Premier Serv. Co., 38 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
136. Lands v. Boyster, 417 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Mo. 1967).
137. 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986).
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be able to push plaintiff's case above the 50% probability threshold. 1 8 Thus
under Missouri law damages for increased risk are not recoverable.
C. Policy and Possible Alternative Theories
The result reached under the "more likely than not approach" gives rise
to a serious problem. A plaintiff who is exposed and tries to bring a claim for
increased risk will be denied recovery. As a result, if he or she does eventually
develop cancer the injury will go uncompensated.139 On the other hand, if the
plaintiff waits to sue until after cancer has developed the statute of limitations
may well have run.1 40 This no-win situation has led many courts and commen-
tators to develop theories which allow a plaintiff to recover for at least a por-
tion of his increased risk.141
1. Proportional Recovery
One of the most common ideas in this area, but one which has yet to be
adopted by any court is "Proportional Recovery"." 2 Under this approach, the
percentage increase in risk is multiplied by the cost of treating cancer. 148 For
example, say the citizens of our small Missouri town have had their risk of
developing cancer increase from 5 % to 10 %, increasing the risk by 5 %. Also
assume that currently it costs one million dollars to treat cancer. Under pro-
portional recovery the plaintiff could recover 5% of $1,000,000 or $50,000.
While on its face this approach seems to balance the competing interests
involved (plaintiff's right to' recover if he does develop cancer and the defend-
ant's right not to pay for unmanifested damages), when fully analyzed it falls
short of justice on either side. First, unless a way can be found to characterize
the increased risk as a present injury, the approach requires that an award be
based on possibility or on an expansion of present injury so that the increased
risk can fall under the relaxed standards of parasitic claims. 44 Even if this is a
wise choice, the courts show little indication of adopting it."45 This is due to a
138. See supra notes 90-96, 128 and accompanying text.
139. Note, supra note 124, at 854.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 520-21 (5th
Cir. 1984); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 520-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556,-, 495 A.2d 495,
502 (1985); Cooper, Assessing Possibilities in Damage Awards - The Loss of a
Chance or the Chance of a Loss, 37 SASK. L. REV. 193, 196-97 (1972-73); Dworkin,
supra note 5, at 570-72; Gale & Goyer, supra note 4, at 742-43; Note, supra note 124,
at 860-61; Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REv.
563, 577-78 (1984).
142. See Cooper, supra note 141, at 196-97; Gale & Goyer, supra note 4, at
741-43; Note, supra note 124, at 860-61; Note, supra note 141, at 577-78.
143. Note, supra note 124, at 860.
144. See generally Gale & Goyer, supra note 4, at 737-43.
145. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); Ea-
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number of difficult problems. Allowing current recovery for a plaintiff who
does not develop cancer is a windfall. 46
On the other hand, a plaintiff who does develop cancer in the future,
while having more money than a plaintiff denied recovery under the "more
likely than not" approach, still does not receive a full recovery since the jury
bases its award on a less than one hundred percent chance of developing can-
cer. In addition, a plaintiff who does not recover any proportional increased
risk damages and does develop cancer is left with the disease and no money,
the same result achieved under the majority approach. 147
All these results are possible under proportional recovery because the ac-
tion for increased risk is based on speculative testimony and not sound
probabilities, ' 4 a fact which also violates the notion that a case should be
decided on the best quality evidence available.-49
But another theory has been proposed which characterizes increased risk
as a current element of damages. Under this view a person has a legal interest
in maintaining his or her current risk level. Exposure and subsequent in-
creased risk, it is argued, constitute a compensable invasion of that interest. 50
The compensation for the invasion is not based upon academic evaluation of
risks prior to and after defendants negligent conduct, but is given for in three
types of claims which are all potentially compensable. First, the invasion will
probably result in an increased apprehension of developing cancer. This result
is, as seen in the section on fear of cancer, compensable under the tort of
infliction of emotional distress. But if this were the only response to the exis-
tence of an increased risk, the counter would be, of course, that the increased
risk may also manifest itself in actually developing cancer. This issue, how-
ever, can be addressed by allowing a claim in the future if cancer ever devel-
ops. Such an approach, however, has problems as will be seen below.' 5 ' In
addition, the invasion of this risk interest will give rise to expenses incurred for
increased medical surveillance aimed at discovering if the person exposed has
developed cancer. This, however, is also compensable. 152 But regardless of the
merits of a claim that a person has a legal interest in maintaining his or her
current risk level, such a claim does not circumvent the other problems in-
gle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Pierce v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983); Devlin v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985).
146. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 523-24.
147. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119; Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 523-24 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
148. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text; see also Eagle-Picher In-
dus., 481 So. 2d at 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
149. See, e.g., Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119; Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 521.
150. See, Note, supra note 124, at 861 & n.87.
151. See infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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volved in allowing current recovery for increased risk.153
2. Cost of Increased Medical Surveillance
A more viable approach to this problem of increased risk is that a plain-
tiff should be compensated for the costs of increased medical surveillance.15'
This is an award for those medical expenses which will be incurred for the
increased medical scrutiny the plaintiff must undergo to discover whether the
disease is, in fact, developing. 5 ' This approach has been approved of in a few
cases."56 The problem remains, however, that a plaintiff who does develop can-
cer will be vastly under compensated since he or she will have received medi-
cal bills only for the tests leading up to eventual diagnosis and not for the
actual expenses of treating the disease.
Overpayment does not appear to be a problem in this instance, at least on
the surface. It is conceivable, however, that after such an award a plaintiff
might not go to the doctor either because she fears the results of the tests or
because she doesn't believe she'll get cancer after all. In the former, the de-
fendant has clearly overpaid. The response to this is, however, that the plain-
tiff is entitled to those damages regardless of his future conduct. Just because
one is entitled to do something doesn't mean they must or that the law should
force them to do it. In the latter case, however, not only does plaintiff's post-
award conduct result in over-payment, but it also calls into question the valid-
ity of the claim upon which the award was based. The defendant could assert
that the original suit was fraudulent or malicious and, as a result, should be
set aside. The possibility of a later suit to set aside such awards comes from
the fact that the damages for increased medical surveillance are based on the
assumption that the plaintiff will seek medical attention. Future medical bills
in the normal personal injury claim are distinguishable simply because they
are based on an existing injury - a fact not present in most toxic exposure
cases. Thus, it is at least possible that this approach will cause problems to
substitute for those it solves.
3. "Wait and See" Approach
a. The Approach in General
By far the most appealing approach to fear of cancer for toxic exposure
153. See supra notes 76-77, 87 and accompanying text.
154. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 570-72.
155. Id.
156. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, -, 495 A.2d
495, 500 (1985); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 572-73, 461 A.2d
184, 190 (Law Div. 1983); see also Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir 1984) (diagnostic damages awarded in plane crash case
on policy grounds similar to those enunciated in Ayers).
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cases has been dubbed the "wait and see" approach.15 It has been proposed
and adopted in several cases.158 Under this view a plaintiff can sue for current
injuries resulting from the exposure'5 9 and still preserve a future cause of ac-
tion if cancer develops.' 60 The approach manages to solve all the problems
attendant with recovery for increased risk before cancer develops. Namely, the
evidence will no longer be speculative - the plaintiff will have cancer by the
time he's allowed to recover for cancer.' In addition, the plaintiff will receive
full compensation while being disabled from receiving a windfall.' 62
Despite its advantages, the "wait and see" approach does have drawbacks
where one attempts to apply it in certain jurisdictions. To begin with, it re-
quires the adoption of the discovery rule (i.e. that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the damage caused by defendant's breach of duty
is, or reasonably should have been, discovered by the plaintiff).163 This is be-
cause the statute of limitations must be tolled until cancer develops. If it is
not, the "wait and see" approach becomes empty because cancer has a long
latency period. 6 4 Statutes of limitation which begin to run at the breach of
duty clearly would have run before most cases of cancer caused by exposure
develop.'6 5 It follows that a jurisdiction which has not previously adopted a
discovery rule will be unable to utilize the "wait and see" approach. 66
The discovery rule is necessary not only to circumvent the statute of limi-
tations problem, but is also utilized to avoid the second problem with the "wait
and see" approach. This is the common law prohibition of splitting a cause of
action. Traditionally, a plaintiff has only one cause of action for a single
breach of duty. Thus, he or she must seek recovery for all present and future
damages at one time.' Without an exception or a finessing of the rule, a
plaintiff is faced with a difficult choice. He or she can either sue when the
157. Note, supra note 124, at 850.
158. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1984); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495
(1985); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
159. For example, asbestosis, emotional distress and medical surveillance.
160. See supra note 158.
161. Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 521 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985). It should be
noted, however, that the issue of linkage between the exposure and the cancer may be
difficult to prove. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
162. Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 521.
163. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Jackson, 727 F.2d at 518, 521; Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656,
663-64, 464 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1983); Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at -, 495 A.2d at 501
(1985); Note, supra note 124, at 851.
164. See, e.g., Jackson, 727 F.2d at 517 (latency period for mesothelioma ranges
from twenty to forty years).
165. Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. 556, -, 495 A.2d 495, 501-03 (1985); Note,
supra note 124, at 854-55.
166. See generally Note, supra note 124, at 851-52.
167. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (con-
struing Texas law); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 24-26 (1982).
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cancer develops and run the substantial risk that the statute of limitations will
run; or sue now for the increased risk of cancer and be subject to a strict
"more likely than not" standard as to the development of cancer.168 Thus, a
plaintiff who is exposed and does develop cancer is again left without recovery.
It is this problem, as well as the inequities involved in allowing a present
claim for increased risk, which has led many courts to fashion exceptions to
the rule against claim splitting. They have done so both by a number of legal
theories 69 and on policy grounds. 17 0 The result is that a plaintiff can sue a
second time when (and only if)17 1 cancer develops, assuring that his or her
claim is not frivolous, that it won't result in defendant paying a windfall, and
that the case will be decided on the best evidence available. Even so, unless the
jurisdiction allows recovery for reasonable expenses of increased medical sur-
veillance and diagnosis either at the first or second trial, a plaintiff who does
develop cancer remains under-compensated.
However, some courts are not willing to adopt this approach. For exam-
ple, in Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,1 72 the court found that a plain-
tiff could not sue a second time at a later date for cancer developed in the
interim,1 73 despite the fact Texas had apparently adopted the discovery rule in
asbestos cases. 7 The reason stated in Gideon was that Texas law permitted
168. Note, supra note 124, at 854-55.
169. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1985) (using a causal analysis, i.e., that until cancer has developed causation of cancer
has not occurred); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (asbestosis and mesothelioma are separate and distinct diseases and the statute
of limitations on mesothelioma does not begin to run when asbestosis develops); Good-
man v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1035
(1977) (applying N.J. law and stating that asbestosis and cancer proceed along two
separate causal chains thus constituting two separate causes of action); Martinez-Fer-
rer v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d. 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980)
(holding that later developed cancer would be an independent and non-simultaneous
injury when compared to the present injuries); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202
N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985) (holding that rule against claim splitting not
violated due to the separate and distinct nature of the injuries).
170. Jackson, 727 F.2d at 519 (evidence better when cancer has developed); Ea-
gle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (implied
from policies and equities cited as reasons for denying present recovery for increased
risk); Devlin, 202 N.J. Super. at _, 495 A.2d at 502-03 (1985) (citing Martinez-
Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 105 Cal. 3d. 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980)) (need
to fashion relief as situations previously unanticipated by such rigid rules develop).
171. It should be noted that since a plaintiff can sue for cancer only if cancer
develops, the possible judicial efficiency argument against this approach is ameliorated.
Two trials may be required, but since the incidence of cancer is low when compared to
the potential number of present increased risk cases, judicial efficiency is arguably im-
proved. In addition one avoids the delay tactics a plaintiff would be encouraged to use
under the traditional system to insure as many injuries as possible manifested them-
selves before the case goes to trial. See Note, supra note 124, at 855-56.
172. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law).
173. Id. at 1137.
174. Id.; Castorina v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 578 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (S.D. Tex.
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only one cause of action for one breach of duty.17 5 Since the claims cannot be
split, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as any injury resulting
from defendant's breach becomes apparent. Thus, when any injury resulting
from a breach manifests itself, the plaintiff must sue for all present and future
damages. He is confronted with the impossible task of proving that his expo-
sure resulted in a greater than fifty percent chance that he will develop
cancer.
I76
b. Availability of "Wait and See" in Missouri
Missouri law is remarkably similar to that of Texas on these issues. Even
though no cases can be found specifically stating that the Missouri statute of
limitations is tolled until the discovery of a latent disease, 7 7 Missouri's general
statute of limitations1 7 8 is clearly discovery oriented. The statute states:
Civil actions ... can only be commenced ... after the cause of action shall
have accrued; provided that ... the cause of action shall not be deemed to
accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of... duty occurs, but
when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertain-
ment, and if more than one item of damage, then the last item so that all
resulting damage may be recovered, and full an complete relief obtained. 7 9
When combined with the period allotted to personal injury actions 8" it is
clear that a plaintiff has five years from the point at which he ascertains, or
reasonably should have ascertained, the injury. The only exception to this is
for medical malpractice. 81 In the area of toxic exposure, the application of the
1984), affid, 758 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 137 (1985).
175. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir.
1985).
176. See Note, supra note 124, at 854-55.
177. The only line of cases found was one discussing the development of silicosis
in the context of the Federal Employers Liability Act. The statute of limitations in that
context was three years from the time the cause of action accrued. 45 U.S.C.A. § 56
(West 1986). In the case of Farrar v. Saint Louis & S.F. Ry., 361 Mo. 408, 235
S.W.2d 391 (1950), it was held that failure to provide an employee with an adequate
respirator while he painted railroad cars was a continuing tort. Id. at 393. In that
context it was held that the statute of limitations began to run from the time that the
unsafe conditions are removed or from the termination of the employment, which ever
occurs first. Id. Accord Rowe v. Gatke Corp., 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1942) (asbestosis);
Minyard v. Woodward Iron Co., 81 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ala. 1948); Plazak v. Alle-
gheny Steel Co., 324 Pa. 422, 188 A. 130 (1936) (statute runs from last tortious act);
Tennessee Eastman Corp. v. Newman, 22 Tenn. App. 270, 121 S.W.2d 130 (1938)
(continuing tort statute of limitations runs from cessation of employment).
178. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.100 (1986).
179. Id.
180. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1986).
181. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (1986) which generally provides that the
statute runs from the date of the negligent act except in instances where foreign objects
are left in the body after surgery. Missouri courts have consistently refused to adopt
the discovery rule in medical malpractice despite the inconsistency with Mo. REv.
STAT. § 516.100 (1986). This is true under the postulate of statutory construction
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statute allows a plaintiff to file an action up to five years after he discovers
that cancer has developed.182 The statute begins to run after a right to prose-
cute the claim has accrued or, to put it another way, when the damages be-
come recoverably certain. 183 Practically, since damages for increased risk are
not "recoverably certain" under Missouri's "more likely than not" standard, a
plaintiff cannot successfully prosecute a claim for increased risk until cancer
develops. Thus, the statute of limitations would be tolled until that time.
This, however, does not solve the problem. Missouri allows only one cause
of action for a single breach of duty.1 This means that when any damage
(i.e. cancerphobia) manifests itself after an exposure has occurred, the plaintiff
must either sue now for this fear and, at the same time attempt to bring an
action for increased risk (which will be nearly impossible due to the "more
likely than not" standard) or to wait until cancer develops. By that time, how-
ever, the statute will almost certainly have run on the "cancerphobia"
claim.1 85 Thus, under current Missouri law the "wait and see" approach will
not be available; leaving plaintiffs compensated for their fears but not the dis-
ease or compensated for the disease and not their fears.
There are two ways to circumvent this harsh result. The first is the view
that the exposure operates as a continuing tort. The numerous claims resulting
from a continuing tort need not be brought at the same time. 80 This is echoed
in Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (1986) which provides that the statute will run
from the discovery of the last item of damage. 87 It follows that if exposure to
toxic chemicals can be considered as a continuing tort a plaintiff could sue
which states that where general and specific statutes conflict the specific one controls.
See, e.g., Young v. Medrano, 713 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Miller v. Duhart,
637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The medical malpractice statute of limitations,
however, has been held void as applied to minors under Article I, § 14 of the Missouri
Constitution. Strahler v. Saint Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); see
also Note, Will Missouri's "Open Courts" Guarantee Open the Door to Adoption of
the "Discovery Rule" in Medical Malpractice Cases?, 52 Mo. L. REv. 977 (1987).
182. The statute of limitations runs from the date the suit can be maintained.
Baron v. Kurn, 349 Mo. 1202, 164 S.W.2d 310 (1942); State ex. rel. Sisters of St.
Mary v. Campbell, 511 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
183. Davis v. Laclede Gas Co., 603 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (quoting
with approval Comment, Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitation, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (1950)); Stafford v. Muster, 582 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1979)
(en banc); DePaul Hosp. School of Nursing v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 S.W.2d
542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
184. Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 354 Mo. 461, 189
S.W.2d 538 (1945).
185. This is because of the long latency of cancer. See supra note 164 and ac-
companying text. The fear of claim will accrue shortly after the plaintiff learns that he
or she has been exposed to a known or suspected carcinogen. Since cancer may not
develop for as long as decades after the exposure, the five year period will have run.
186. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1936), over-
ruled on other grounds, 423 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1968).
187. "and if more than one item of damage, then the last item .... " Mo. REv.
STAT. § 516.100 (1986).
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now for emotional distress or already developed disease and years later could
collect for cancer should it develop. This argument could prove problematic
for courts since, on the one hand, it can be aruged that the exposure ends
when the toxic substance is removed from the plaintiff's environment or when
the plaintiff leaves the proximity of the substance. 188 On the other hand, if it is
found that the chemicals remain in, and thus in contact with, the human body
for long periods of time, it could be argued that the exposure is continuous.
The second way to find a solution to the problem is to fashion an excep-
tion to the rule against claim splitting, or to find that the rule is not violated.
Many courts have done so already.18 9 Regardless of the approach taken, the
plaintiff is given all the damages to which he or she is entitled - a policy
codified in Missouri's general statute of limitations.190
4. Combined Approach
One author suggests that a combination of the "wait and see" approach
and the proportional recovery approach could be utilized.19' He notes, how-
ever, that no courts nor commentators have supported the notion.' 92 In addi-
tion, he acknowledges that the theory seems to allow double recovery. 193 Yet,
he argues that the theory is logically and legally permissable because a plain-
tiff who is exposed to toxic substances has suffered the invasion of two inter-
ests (i.e. the interest in maintaining his risk level and damages for developed
cancer). 19'
But this combined approach is not sound. Even if the risk maintenance
interest is valid, it would be fully compensated by damages for fear of cancer,
by compensation for increased medical surveillance and by the later cause of
action for developed cancer allowed by the "wait and see" approach. 19 5 The
"wait and see" approach does not preclude recovery for damages that appear
immediately after defendant's breach of duty. It allows a present claim for
present damages (which includes fear of cancer and increased surveillance 98)
and preserves one for future damages should cancer develop.197 In that it com-
188. For example, when the spill in the hypothetical is cleaned up or the plaintiff
leaves the scene of the accident. Essentially, this is the position of the court in Farrar v.
Saint Louis & S.F. Ry., 361 Mo. 408, 235 S.W.2d 391 (1950) which discussed when a
cause of action accrued for continuing torts under the statute of limitations under the
Federal Employers Liability Act and held that it ran from the termination of employ-
ment or when the unsafe condition was removed. Id. at 393.
189. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
190. "so that all resulting damage may be recovered, and full and complete re-
lief obtained." Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (1986) (emphasis added).




195. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
197. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1985); Dev-
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pensates something already provided for under the "wait and see" approach, it
is clear that this combined approach allows impermissible double recovery.
5. A Suggested Solution
None of the approaches yet developed are completely satisfactory. Pro-
portional recovery may result in windfall, under-compensation, and unneces-
sary suits.' 98 Recovery for increased surveillance could leave a plaintiff under
compensated and allow a potential basis for further law suits.1 9 The "wait
and see" approach also does not fully compensate a plaintiff who develops can-
cer unless costs for increased surveillance are included.200 Combined recovery
is simply out of the question because it allows double recovery.20' It appears,
then, that another solution must be found. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp.2'0
may provide the answer.
In Devlin, emotional distress claims for a current fear of cancer were al-
lowed, 20 3 as were damages for increased medical surveillance. 20 In addition, a
later cause of action for developed cancer was preserved. 05 The result of this
view is that plaintiff can recover for all her damages arising from the expo-
sure. Both present injuries and the injuries resulting from increased risk are
compensable should the plaintiff meet her burden of proof. In addition, the
defendant is protected from the possibilities of overpayment, policing the
plaintiff's future conduct, frivolous suits and recoveries based on speculative
evidence, all of which are present in the other approaches. The concerns of
both plaintiffs and defendants are met. This result is not achieved by any of
the approaches taken singly. Due to the current condition of Missouri law,
however, the approach is unavailable since the "wait and see" facet cannot be
accomplished without modification of law dealing with claim splitting. 06
The "wait and see" approach, which is a vital part of the Devlin scheme,
has raised several concerns. Specifically, it has been suggested that evidence of
the defendant's negligence has been lost or destroyed.20 7 This, however, ignores
the fact that there will often be a previous "fear of" claim between the parties
lin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985).
198. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
202. 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985).
203. Id. at 499.
204. Id. at 500.
205. Id. at 500-01. It should be noted that allowing a distinct claim for later
developed cancer avoids the need of proportional recovery. If plaintiff does develop can-
cer and can meet his burden at trial, he will recover 100% of his damages. If he does
not or cannot prove his case, then he cannot recover and should not be able to recover a
proportion of the potential costs.
206. See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
207. Note, supra note 124, at 857.
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which must satisfy either the tort of negligent or of intentional infliction of
emotional distress; or (at least in Missouri) the elements of strict liability.208
The decision of the issue of the defendant's liability would be fixed by res
judicata and specific facts of the claims 20 9 would be subject to the rules of
collateral estoppel.
Another concern is that the "wait and see" approach lacks deterrent ef-
fect since so much time passes between the exposure and the imposition of
liability.210 But, this ignores the deterrent effect of the "cancerphobia" claims,
which often are included with claims for increased risk.2" Further, there is the
problem of the bankruptcy or disappearance of the defendant. 12 This concern,
however, is one which plaintiffs face in all cases. It does not prevent granting
relief in other instances and should not do so here.
V. CONCLUSION
Under Missouri's abrogation of the impact and physical consequences
rules, a claim for a present fear of developing cancer is available for victims of
toxic exposure. The issues and proof could become quite complex and expen-
sive, but this does not constitute a legal bar to recovery. In addition, it might
be possible to bring an action sounding in strict products liability for certain
exposures - a theory apparently unavailable in any other jurisdiction.2 1 3
Recovery for increased risk, however, seems unlikely since a plaintiff can-
not split his or her causes of action and must meet a virtually insurmountable
standard of proof.21 4 Thus, it appears that the Missouri plaintiff who is ex-
posed and does develop cancer (and can meet the proof requirements of causa-
tion) is vastly under-compensated, if he is compensated at all.
Of the approaches discussed, a combination of an emotional distress claim
coupled with cost of increased surveillance and allowing a later claim for can-
cer will come the closest to fully compensating the plaintiff while protecting
the rights of defendants. But under Missouri law this option is currently un-
available.2 1 5 As a result, this inequity will not be addressed without a change
to Missouri law which fashions an exception to the rule against claim splitting
208. See supra notes 26-45, 108-23 and accompanying text.
209. For example, the dose of the carcinogen to which the plaintiff was exposed.
Note, supra note 124, at 857.
210. See Note, supra note 141, at 585.
211. See, e.g., Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986).
212. E.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 n.21 (5th
Cir. 1986); see also, Note, supra note 124, at 858 & n.68.
213. See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
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based on law and/or policy or decides that the anti-claim splitting rule is not
violated by a later claim for developed cancer.
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